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Abstract1 
 
Non–compliance with regulations by enterprises is said to be rife in developing 
countries.  Yet there is limited systematic evidence of the magnitude of non-compliance 
at the enterprise level.  Making innovative use of two complementary data sources, we 
are able to quantify non-compliance for India’s Factories Act without the question of 
illegality ever being raised directly with enterprises.  We find that more than twice as 
many firms are not complying as are complying.  Further, we find the number of non-
compliant firms is much larger than the number of firms adjusting out of the regulation.  
Thus non-compliance with the Factories is a key feature of the “missing middle” in India. 
We explore the main trends and patterns of non-compliance and highlight a number of 
key issues for further analytical and policy research. 
  
                                                 
* The views expressed here are those of the authors and not of any institution they may be associated with. 
1 We thank the seminar participants at CDS-Trivandrum, the Reserve Bank of India and the World Bank, New Delhi, 
for their comments and feedback. 
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1. Introduction 
The regulatory burden on enterprise is a central topic in policy and popular 
discourse.  Even the use of the word “burden” clearly conveys the tenor the discussion.  It 
is often argued that enterprises are “overburdened” with regulation, and that these 
regulations impose costs which hinder enterprise productivity and growth.  The policy 
prescription of this line of argument seems clear—to deregulate heavily.  And yet the 
regulations were presumably introduced for a purpose.  Economic theory suggests a 
number of contexts in which regulation can be beneficial to the economy and society as a 
whole.  This line of argument, then, would be cautious about deregulation. 
 
India is no exception to the global debate on regulation. It is common place to 
find the argument that enterprise registration, labor laws and a multitude of other 
regulations are stifling enterprise and holding back the efficiency and growth of firms and 
with it the progress of the economy.  A central piece of legislation is India’s Factories 
Act of 1948, which requires manufacturing enterprises of a certain size to register and 
thence comply with other regulations.  This also defines the “organized” sector in India. 
The Factories Act is often suggested as one of the reasons for India’s “missing middle” in 
terms of enterprise size, since the requirement to register starts at 10 workers  (20 
workers if not using electricity).  It is thought to hold back expansion of promising 
enterprises, inducing them to stay “beneath the radar screen” of the regulation.  Yet for 
supporters of this Act it is an important component of providing protection of workers’ 
health and safety in the workplace, as well as the bulwark for protection of other worker 
rights. 
 
It is striking is how little account is taken of non-compliance in these two major 
strands of argument.  Those in favor of regulation argue on the basis of assumed 
compliance.  Those against must also be arguing on the basis of compliance, because 
presumably non-compliance makes the regulatory burden less.  At the extreme, if there is 
no enforcement and no compliance at all, then it is as though the regulation did not exist. 
However, if there is partial enforcement then there may be costs of evading the regulation 
and its enforcement.  What should be clear is that without an account of non-compliance, 
the discourse on regulation is severely incomplete.  How much non-compliance is there? 
Who complies and who does not?  How has the extent and pattern of non-compliance 
changed over time?  Without answers to these questions the regulation debate takes place 
in an unreal theoretical setting which may not match reality on the ground. 
 
The evidence for non-compliance at the enterprise level, in India and globally, is 
mainly anecdotal.  Stories based on individual experience abound.  There is limited 
systematic evidence of the extent, nature and causes of non-compliance.  One reason is 
that it is obviously difficult to ascertain non-compliance, in other words illegality, 
through a direct survey instrument, which is also needed to get information on possible 
correlates of non-compliance.  However, there are some instances where non-compliance 
can be identified through indirect means.  For example, in the case of minimum wage 
regulation, labor force surveys or household surveys routinely collect information on 
wages of the interviewed workers, as well as information on the nature of their 
employment.  By matching the location/sector/occupation of each worker with official 
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gazetted minimum wages, it can be ascertained whether or not a minimum wage violation 
is taking place, without ever approaching the enterprise in which the individual works.2 
But for this very reason these worker based approaches do not have the detailed 
enterprise level information needed for further firm based analysis of non-compliance. 
 
However, for the Factories Act (1948) in India, there is also an indirect method 
for determining non-compliance which does not broach illegality directly.  Rather, the 
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) surveys the universe of enterprises which 
are not registered under this Act and, inter-alia, asks about number of workers and 
electricity usage, which together define the criterion for required registration under the 
Act. Using this data source, therefore, non-compliance can quantified.  These 
quinquennial NSSO surveys have of course been used in the past for a number of 
purposes, but not in any systematic way to explore magnitudes and patterns of non-
compliance.3 In this paper we provide recent estimates for non-compliance and explore 
some of its patterns.  We find non-compliance to be significant. Indeed, as many firms 
are not complying as are complying.  Further, we find the number of non-compliant firms 
is much larger than the number of firms adjusting out of the regulation.  We explore the 
main trends and patterns of non-compliance and highlight issues for analytical and policy 
research. 
 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews the theory of responses to 
regulation including non-compliance, and provides the frame for our investigation. 
Section 3 describes the Indian institutional setting and our data set, and presents the main 
trends on compliers, evaders, avoiders and outsiders to India’s Factories Act.  Section 4 
focuses on non-compliance and explores some key patterns of non-compliance in India. 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of policy implications and highlights areas for 
further analytical and policy research. 
 
 
2. Theory: Regulation, Compliance and Types of Informality 
There is a large literature on the economic theory of (non) compliance with laws 
and regulation.  The empirical literature is more scant, particularly in developing 
countries, because of the data issues mentioned in the introduction.  At one level the 
theoretical framework is straightforward.  Following Becker (1968) the problem for an 
individual is posed as the balance between the benefits of breaking the law and the costs 
of doing so.  The costs depend on the probability of getting caught, and on the penalty 
imposed if caught.  Tax evasion was among the earliest issues explored in this 
framework, starting with the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972); a recent review is 
provided by Slemrod (2007).  In the same spirit, the initial investigation of compliance 
with minimum wage legislation by Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) has led to a significant 
theoretical and empirical literature (for recent examples, see Basu, Chau and Kanbur, 
2010, and Ronconi, 2010). 
                                                 
2 For an application of this method to South Africa see Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2012), and for an application to 
Chile see Kanbur, Ronconi and Wedenoja (2013). 
3 For example, Bedi and Banerjee (2007) and Nagraj (2002). 
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Within the broad framework outlined in the literature above, we can pose as 
follows the specific decision for an enterprise on whether or not to register under India’s 
Factory Act of 1948.  Let output Y be a function of labor, L, and an entrepreneurial 
ability or productivity parameter, A.  If the production function is F(L, A) and the wage is 
w then profit, π, in a world without regulation is given by 
 
π = F(L, A) – wL 
 
The firm is assumed to choose employment to maximize profit.  There is then a “natural” 
size distribution of firms by employment size, given by L(A).  Standard assumptions 
ensure that L is increasing in A—more productive firms are larger.  Suppose now that a 
regulation is brought in which requires registration if employment exceeds L^.  Suppose 
further than registration imposes a fixed cost of T.  Then with perfect enforcement profits 
are 
 
 π =  F(L, A) – wL      if L ≤ L^ 
        F(L, A) – wL – T            if L > L^ 
 
 With this framework, we can characterize the patterns of response by firms with 
different productivity A.  
 
Let A^ be the value of A at which a firm would employ L^ in the unregulated 
economy.  It can then be shown that under certain conditions there exists a value of A, 
such that A1>A^, with the following properties: 
 
 For A greater than A1, the firm registers. 
 For A between A1 and A^ the firm puts itself outside the regulation by 
employing L^ workers. 
 For A less than or equal to A^ the firm would employ less than L^ workers 
even without the regulation, and so is outside the remit of the regulation. 
 
Of course for firms with A less than A^ the regulation does not bite and the pre-
regulation size distribution is unchanged.  For A greater than A^ employment size is 
unaffected in this specification because the costs of registration are in the form of fixed 
costs.  The dramatic impact is on firms with intermediate levels of productivity, who 
reduce employment and output to come out of the regulation net.4  This is, indeed, the 
“missing middle” which has been much discussed, particularly in the Indian context.5 
 
 Now consider the situation where there is at is at least some enforcement of the 
regulation.  This can be modeled, and is usually modeled, with risk neutral enterprises 
that face an expected cost if they violate the regulation.  This is the product of the 
probability, p, of getting caught and the penalty, C, if caught.  If p and C both depend on 
L, the firm’s profit function, , has several components: 
 
                                                 
4 For a similar argument in the context of taxation thresholds, see Chatterjee and Wingender (2012) 
5 Mazumdar and Sarkar (2008) 
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 =  F(L, A) – wL        if L ≤ L^ 
               F(L, A) – wL –T             if L > L^ and registration 
        F(L, A) – wL - p(L)C(L)       if L > L^ , and no registration 
        
The firm now has two decisions to make simultaneously, whether to register and 
how many workers to employ.  The answer clearly depends on the specification of p(L) 
and C(L) relative to T.  For example, if the probability of getting caught is close to one or 
the penalty is very high then there is no violation of the regulation.  If p and C do not 
depend on L, then to register or not is essentially a comparison of two fixed cost terms T 
and pC, and all firms either register or do not.  However, if p(L) and C(L) are increasing 
in L, for example, if detection is easier with larger firms or if the penalty for non-
registration is higher for larger firms, then it can be shown that there are intermediate 
ranges of p, T and C where under certain conditions there exist values of A,  A1 > A2 >A^ 
with the following properties6: 
 
 For A greater than A1, the firm registers. 
 For A between A1 and A2, there is non-compliance--firm is required to 
register but does not and is thus illegal. 
 For A between A2 and A^ the firm puts itself outside the regulation by 
employing L^ workers. 
 For A less than or equal to A^ the firm would employ less than L^ workers 
even without the regulation, and so is outside the remit of the regulation. 
 
The intuition behind these ranges is straightforward.  Clearly for A less than or 
equal to A^, in other words for those firms which would employ less than L^ workers in a 
world without regulation, the regulation does not bite and the size distribution is 
unaffected as before.  For A above A^ a fixed cost of T is paid if registered, and a cost of 
p(L)C(L) if not registered.  Whatever the relative values of these two, for A slightly 
above A^ both of these are large enough to make it worthwhile to move out of regulation 
altogether by employing L^ workers.  As A^ rises so does the return from employing 
more workers.  As the productivity threshold of A2 is crossed it is worthwhile to hire 
more than L^ workers, whether with registration or not.  However, p(L) and C(L) are still 
small enough relative to T to make it worthwhile to violate the regulation.  As 
productivity and, thus, firm scale continues to rise beyond the next threshold A1, p(L) and 
C(L) now become so large that they dominate the saving of the registration cost T by not 
registering. Hence firms above A2 will always register. 
 
Suppose, for example, that L^ is 10 workers.  Then the theory suggests that 
enterprises can be classified into four categories: 
 
A. Enterprises which fall into the ambit of the law and comply.  For example, a 20 
worker enterprise which registers.  These are the “compliers”, who constitute the 
organized or formal sector. 
                                                 
6 There are many papers with variants of these results for different specifications. A recent example is de Paula and 
Scheinkman (2007). See also Kanbur and Keen (2013) in the context of tax avoidance and evasion. This strand of the 
literature grows out of the original work of Lucas (1978). 
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B. Enterprises which fall into the ambit of the law but do not comply.  For example, 
a 15 worker enterprise which does not comply.  These enterprises are operating 
illegally relative to the law in question.  They are the “evaders.” 
 
C. Enterprises which are not in the ambit of the law but only because they have 
adjusted out of the scope of the law. For example, a 9 worker enterprise, which 
would have been a 12 worker enterprise without the regulation.  These are the 
“avoiders.” 
 
D. Enterprises which are not in the ambit of the law because even their pre-
regulation activity would not have been covered by the law.  For example, a 2 
worker enterprise.  We might call these the “naturally informal.”  Another label 
for them would be the “outsiders.” 
 
The argument above gives a new twist to the “missing middle” thesis.  It says that 
there are two phenomena to look for in the middle of the “natural” size distribution.  The 
first is a movement out of the middle to avoid registration costs.  The second, however, is 
non-compliance to evade registration costs.  Alongside the “missing” middle is then the 
“present” but non-compliant middle.  
 
With this conceptual backdrop, we now move to examine the extent and nature of 
non-compliance with India’s Factories Act (1948). 
 
 
3. Compliers, Evaders, Avoiders and Outsiders 
 The Factories Act (1948) states that all enterprises in manufacturing who use 
electricity and have 10 workers or more, and all enterprises with 20 workers or more who 
do not use electricity, are required to register. Registered enterprises are referred to as the 
organized (“formal”) sector. Information about registered enterprises is gathered through 
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).  Every five years the National Sample Survey 
Organisation (NSSO) conducts a survey of enterprises that are not registered under the 
Factories Act, in other words, of the “unorganized” sector.  The survey collects a large 
amount of information on these enterprises, including the number of workers and 
electricity usage.  It is possible, therefore, to analyze the extent and nature of non-
compliance with the Factories Act using this information. 
 
 Although the “shorthand” characterization of the organized sector is often in 
terms of “10 workers or more”, as noted above the actual Act also has a differentiation 
between enterprises who do and who do not use electricity—for those who do not, the 
threshold is 20 workers or more.  However, we argue in Appendix A that the electricity 
use criterion, important though it may have been in 1948, is increasingly irrelevant.  In 
what follows we will define formality using just the “10 workers or more” criterion.  
 
Given the two data sources, we can quantify the size of categories A, B, C and D. 
Category A firms are those that have registered under the Factory Act, which are to be 
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found in the ASI data.7 Category B firms are those in the NSSO survey who have 10 
workers or more.  These firms should have registered but have not done so. Category C 
presents a particular difficulty because it is based on a counterfactual—how exactly do 
enterprises adjust out of the regulation?  However, we can argue as follows based on the 
theory of the previous section.  If an enterprise would have had 10 workers or more 
without the regulation but now wishes to adjust out and come in “just below the radar”, 
then it would adjust down to just below 10— in other words, 9 workers.  Thus the 
observed number of firms in the NSSO survey in the 9 worker category will give us an 
overestimate of Category C, since some of the 9 worker firms in the NSSO could be 
“naturally” of size 9 and will not have adjusted out of the regulation.  There is then a 
corresponding underestimate of Category D.  With these definitions, we now move to an 
examination of the levels and trends in the different categories of firms. 
 
Table 1 presents the magnitudes and characteristics of groupings A, B, C and D 
for using the 2009-10 ASI and the 2010-11 NSSO surveys8. It is seen that the formal 
sector (A) accounts for 0.8% of all firms9 and 24.8% of all manufacturing employment. 
The informal sector thus accounts for 75.2% of employment in this data.  As between 
different types of informality, the evaders, (B), account for 91.5% and the avoiders (C) 
account for at most 0.4% of enterprises.  The vast majority of enterprises, 97.3% are in 
category D—the “outsiders.”  Further, the figure in Table 1 is an underestimate of this 
category since not all of those currently classified in category C are necessarily 
“avoiders.”  The outsiders account for 64.1% of all employment, again an underestimate. 
Thus, the Factories Act directly affects firms that employ at most 35.9% of workers 
(categories A, B and C).  Of the informal sector employment as a whole (B, C and D), the 
evaders account for 13.0% of workers, the avoiders account for at most 1.7%, and the 
outsiders account for the balance of 85.2%.  
 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there are a significant number of firms in the ASI who have less 
than 10 workers—these firms do not need to be registered but are nevertheless registered. This phenomenon has been 
noted before, for example by Bedi and Banerjee (2007). One explanation for this might be that they were once 
registered but have not bothered to or managed to deregister, or are still erroneously being carried on the register. 
Characteristics of these firms are set out in Appendix B. 
8 We use enterprise data from the ASI 2009-10 and the NSSO 2010-11 surveys. The survey period for the ASI was 
from October 2010 to April 2011 and for the NSSO from July 2010 to June 30 2011. 
9 A factory unit is defined as firm here.  
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From the 2010-11 NSSO survey, 256,993 firms had 10 workers or more but were 
not registered. This compares with 143,452 firms registered under the Act, as shown by 
the ASI for 2009-10.  Thus more firms appear to be non-compliant than compliant with 
the law.  Non-compliant firms formed a staggering 64.2% of compliant and non-
compliant enterprises.  However, non-compliant enterprises are much smaller—a mean 
size of 17.7 workers compared to 79.9 workers for compliant enterprises.  The total 
number of workers employed by these non-compliant enterprises was 4,543,668.  This 
compares with 11,500,000 workers employed by all registered firms as shown in the ASI. 
In other words, unregistered enterprises accounted for 28.3% of the labor force of 
compliant and non-compliant enterprises.  
 
How does non-compliance compare to the magnitude of adjustment out of the 
regulation?  In 2010-11 the number of enterprises in the 9 workers category was 67,249, 
with total employment of 605,245.  Thus, even if we attribute all of these enterprises to 
the adjusted out category, their number is less than the number of non-compliant firms, 
and total employment in them is less than a third of that in non-compliant firms.  But 
these are of course overestimates of adjustment out of regulation since it includes firms 
who are naturally of size 9.  It would seem, therefore, that non-compliance with 
regulation dominates adjustment out of regulation by a large margin. 
 
A B C D
ASI Firms 
NSSO Firms with 
10 or employees
NSSO Firms with 
9 employees  NSSO Rest
Number of Firms 143,452                256,993                  67,249                   16,900,000        
Share of Firms 0.8% 1.5% 0.4% 97.3%
Total Employment** 11,500,000          4,543,668               605,245                 29,700,000        
Share of Employment 24.8% 9.8% 1.3% 64.1%
Mean Employment 79.9                       17.7                         9.0                          1.8                       
Median Employment 21                           13                             9                              1                           
Median Labor Productivtiy (Rupees)**** 135,626                59,820                     74,000                   23,400                
* Usage of power is ignored and only the criteria of 10 or more employees is considered for registration under the Factories Act,1948.
   Excludes firms with missng or zero employment.
**Includes unpaid family membes/helpers working in the firm. 
***Capital  here is defined as the value (market value for NSSO and book value for ASI) of assets at the end of the year
****Labor productivity is total gross value added divided by total  employment
Firm Categories
Firm Characteristics
Table 1: Compliers, Evaders, Avoiders and Outsiders under the Factories Act, 1948, in 2009‐10*
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Some idea of the trends is given by comparing the 2010-11 NSSO survey and 
2009-10 ASI with the 2005-06 NSSO survey and ASI in (Table 2).  Share of formal firms 
went from 0.7% of all firms to 0.8% over this five year period, and their employment 
share increased from 19.5% to 24.8%.  Thus, the employment share of total informality 
(B, C and D) declined correspondingly.  The employment share of non-compliant firms 
(B) went from 8.9% to 9.8%, a clear upward trend.  The share of employment of the 
avoiders (C) does not seem to have changed at all, while the share of the outsiders (D) 
went down from 70.3% to 64.1%. In 2005-06 the number of non-compliant enterprises 
was 248,265 compared with 124,710 compliant enterprises, a share of 66.7%, compared 
to a share of 64.2% in 2010-11.  The corresponding share of the workforce was 31.5% in 
2005-06, compared to 28.3% in 2010-11.  There is thus only a very slight downward 
trend in this ratio of non-compliance to compliance, but it remains very high.10 
 
Focusing on 2009-10 (the patterns are similar for 2005-06) it is seen that the 
average size of enterprise falls from A through D—from 79.9 to 17.7 to 9 to 1.8. 
However, the standard deviation of employment is high, especially with the larger sized 
firms. The median in such cases becomes a better average for comparison.  The trend of 
falling average employment from A to D holds true even for the median.  The average 
labor productivity, measured as gross value added divided by total persons employed, of 
firms in category A is more than twice that of the firms in category B and C and nearly 
six times that of the firms in D.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Referring to a much earlier period, Nagraj (2002) finds that “In 1980, 53 percent of factories employing 10 or more 
workers did not register themselves under the Act. This proportion increased to 58 per cent in 1990”. 
A B C D
ASI Firms 
NSSO Firms with 
10 or employees
NSSO Firms with 9 
employees  NSSO Rest
Number of Firms 124,710                  248,265                     62,980                             16,700,000         
Share of Firms 0.7% 1.4% 0.4% 97.5%
Total Employment** 8,809,946               4,042,081                  566,821                           31,800,000         
Share of Employment 19.5% 8.9% 1.3% 70.3%
Mean Employment 70.6                         16.2 9.0                                    1.9                        
Median Employment 20                             12                                9                                        2                            
Median Labor Productivtiy (Rupees)*** 81,884                     32,748                        37,744                             9,432                   
* Usage of power is ignored and only the criteria of 10 or more employees is considered for registration under the Factories Act,1948.
   Excludes firms with missng or zero employment.
**Includes unpaid family membes/helpers working in the firm. 
***Labor productivity is total gross value added divided by total employment
Table 2: Compliers, Evaders, Avoiders and Outsiders under the Factories Act, 1948, in 2005‐06*
Firm Categories
Firm Characteristics
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4. Compliance versus Non-Compliance 
The previous section showed the significant amount of non-compliance with 
India’s Factories Act.  Further, it showed that non-compliance is a phenomenon that is 
much larger than the phenomenon of adjusting out of regulation.  In this section we will 
focus specifically on compliance versus non-compliance.  For this exercise our universe 
is all firms with 10 workers or more, either in the ASI data set or in the NSSO data set.11 
Those in the ASI data asset are compliant, and those in the NSSO data set are non-
compliant.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Recall that in the ASI there are a significant number of enterprises who have less than 10 workers, although these are 
very small and do not account for a large share of employment among ASI firms (only 1.5%, see Appendix B). These 
enterprises are excluded from the analysis of this section. 
Compliant Non‐Compliant
Number of Firms 114,278                                           256,993                                            
Share of Firms 30.8% 69.2%
Total Employment** 11,300,000                                     4,543,668                                        
Share of Employment 71.3% 28.7%
Mean Employment 98.8                                                  17.7                                                   
Median Employment 30                                                     13                                                       
Median Labor Productivtiy (Rupees)**** 151,754                                           59,820                                              
Median Capital‐Output Ratio*** 0.2                                                    0.5                                                     
Median Capital‐Labor Ratio (Rupees)*** 166,727                                           68,947                                              
Median Wage Rate (Rupees) 61,247                                             39,460                                              
Median Gross Value Added Share in Total Output 20.0% 59.2%
Ownership Type (%)
Sole Propreitory 24% 86%
Partnership  32% 12%
 Limited  Co 41% 0%
Others (Co‐operatives, SHG etc) 3% 2%
Location (%)
Rural 39% 43%
Urban 61% 57%
Maintain Books of Accounts (%) 100% 50%
Median Age (years) 12                                                     6                                                         
* Usage of power is ignored and only  criteria of 10 or more employees is considered for registration under the Factories Act,1948.
**Includes unpaid family membes/helpers working in the firm
***Capital  here is defined as the value (market value for NSSO and book value for ASI) of assets at the end of the year
****Labor productivity is total  gross value added divided by total  employment
Table 3: Compliance under the Factories Act, 1948, in 2009‐10*
 
 
unive
locati
firms
Howe
comp
the tw
and li
 
17.7 
comp
positi
the sm
of mo
two c
 
show
that t
Uttar
reaso
show
regist
Furni
Table 3 pr
rse of enterp
on, 57% of 
—the pheno
ver, comply
ared to 6 ye
o types of f
mited comp
 
Complian
for non-com
liant firms a
ve associati
allest size 
re than 500
ategories.  
 
We turn n
s the compli
here are larg
akhand but v
n for these s
s that there i
ering close 
ture and We
esents the b
rises.  From
non-comply
menon thus
ing firms ar
ars.  Finally
irms, with s
anies and pa
t firms are m
pliant firms
nd 28.7% fo
on between 
category of 
 workers, w
ow to patter
ant firms as
e variations
ery weak p
tate patterns
s a clear ind
to full comp
aring Appar
asic data on
 this univer
ing firms ar
 seems roug
e significan
, there are si
ole propriet
rtnerships d
uch larger,
.  The shares
r non-comp
size and com
10-19 worke
ith increase 
ns of compl
 a fraction o
, with good 
erformance 
 could be th
ustrial patte
liance, goin
el.  
13
 compliant a
se, only 30.
e urban, com
hly equally 
tly older, wi
gnificant di
orships dom
ominating a
 with mean e
 of employm
liant firms. 
pliance.  C
rs, to close 
in complian
iance across
f firms requ
performance
in states like
e nature of i
rn in compl
g to complia
nd non-com
8% are comp
pared to 61
spread acros
th a median
fferences in 
inating amo
mong the c
mployment
ent are thu
 Figure 1 sh
ompliance r
to 100% for
ce as size in
 states and a
ired to regis
 in states lik
 Delhi and W
ndustrial co
iance, with p
nce rates of
pliant firms
liant. In ter
% of the co
s the rural-u
 age of 12 y
ownership t
ng the non-c
ompliers. 
 of 98.2 com
s reversed—
ows that the
ates go from
 the largest 
creases in b
cross indus
ter, by state
e Chandiga
est Benga
mposition.  
harmaceuti
 around 20%
 from this 
ms of 
mplying 
rban divide
ears 
ype across 
ompliers, 
pared to 
71.3% for 
re is a 
 15.1% for 
size categor
etween these
try.  Figure 
.  It is seen 
rh and 
l.  One 
Figure 3 
cals 
 in Textiles
. 
y 
 
 
2 
, 
 
 
 
 
 
14
 
 
 
 
Beng
Uttar
neces
prese
nation
and s
avera
indus
 
 
Figures 4 
al, respectiv
akhand show
sarily have 
nt as well, w
al level, lik
tate is seen i
ge on some 
tries.  
and 5 comp
ely.  The Fi
s strong co
strong comp
ith drop off
e Weaving A
n Figure 5 f
industries, a
are industry
gures sugge
mpliance ac
liance rates 
s in complia
pparel, Foo
or West Ben
lthough of c
15
 wise compl
st that the st
ross a range
nationwide.
nce industri
d or Furnitu
gal, which p
ourse lower
iance in Utt
ate effect is
 of industrie
  However, 
es which ar
re.  An inte
erforms be
 than the na
arakhand an
indeed stron
s which do 
the industry
e also doing
raction betw
tter than nat
tional avera
d West 
g. 
not 
 effect is 
 badly at the
een industr
ional 
ge on most 
 
y 
 
 
 
 
 
of co
differ
caugh
litera
patter
inspe
be ad
enfor
indus
resou
Ronc
Afric
factor
outpu
in Fig
produ
shift 
These pat
mpliance wh
ing levels o
t and the co
ture uses res
s of non-com
ctors, and ot
dressed in a
cement outc
try may be a
rces will hav
oni (2010) f
a.  This is an
 
Not only 
 of more tha
t-capital rat
ures 6 and 7
ctivity.  The
of the densit
terns of non
ich vary acr
f enforceme
sts of appre
ources devo
pliance.  In
her budgeta
ttributing ca
omes, since
 function of
e to be inst
or Latin Am
 interesting
are complian
n 2.5.  They
io.  The asso
.  There is a
 kernel den
y for non-co
-compliance
oss state an
nt.  The theo
hension are 
ted to enfor
 the Indian 
ry items, by
usality to an
 the allocatio
 the non-com
rumented ap
erica, and in
 and importa
t firms larg
 also have a
ciation betw
 strong posi
sity of labor
mpliant firm
16
 will be rela
d industry, b
ry suggests
key determi
cement as an
case this wo
 state.  Furth
 association
n of enforc
pliance rat
propriately 
 Bhorat, Ka
nt item on t
er, they hav
 correspond
een labor p
tive correla
 productivit
s. 
ted to a rang
ut they rais
 that the pro
nants of non
 explanator
uld need da
er, there is 
 between en
ement resou
e to begin w
in the econo
nbur and M
he research 
e higher lab
ingly highe
roductivity 
tion between
y of complia
e of costs a
e the import
bability of g
-complianc
y variable in
ta on Factor
an endogene
forcement r
rces to a sta
ith.  Thus e
metrics, as 
ayet (2012)
agenda.  
or productiv
r capital-lab
and complia
 complianc
nt firms is a
nd benefits 
ant issue of 
etting 
e.  The 
 explaining
ies Act 
ity issue to 
esources an
te or an 
nforcement 
is done in 
 for South 
ity, by a 
or ratio and 
nce is show
e and 
 rightward 
 
d 
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
comp
a poli
reduc
small
have 
abilit
firms
comp
The assoc
liance, is co
cy perspect
es size and 
er firms ar e
a sufficient 
y, “A” in the
 similar on a
liance and o
iation betwe
nsistent with
ive, howeve
productvity,
likely to  no
number of c
 theory of S
bility some 
thers into n
en producti
 the predict
r, the interes
 allowing fo
t comply.  C
redible varia
ection 2, an
of which ca
on-complian
17
vity and com
ions of the t
ting questio
r the selecti
orrecting fo
bles that ca
d a data set 
n be argued
ce.  
pliance, an
heory devel
n is whether
on effect tha
r this select
n capture ex
that allows 
 to be select
d also betwe
oped in Sec
 non-compl
t less produ
ion effect re
ogenous en
sufficient m
ed randomly
en size and
tion 2.  From
iance per se
ctive and 
quires us to
trepreneuria
atching of 
 into 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l 
 
 
18
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be a plausible exercise for the Factories Act. 
The two complementary data sets which allow us to quantify the magnitude of 
compliance versus non-compliance are collected for different purposes and under 
different protocols.  This is useful in identifying non-compliance, because the issue of 
illegality is not broached in the NSSO survey.  However, the two data sets do not have a 
sufficient number of varaibles in common which can be plausibly identified with 
exogenous entrepreneurial ability, and which when applied lead to a credible matching 
process12. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has explored the magnitude and patterns in non-compliance with 
India’s Factories Act, a key piece of legislation which is the anchor for the distinction 
between the “organized” and the “unorganized” sectors.  It begins by arguing that 
responses to regulation fall into four categories—compliers, evaders, avoiders and 
outsiders.  Using two complementary data sources the paper provides recent estimates 
and trends for the number of enterprises each of these categories.  The central conclusion 
is that non-compliance is significant.  The number of non-compliant firms (Evaders) 
exceeds the number of compliant firms, and it exceeds an upper bound estimate of the 
number of firms who have adjusted out of the regulation (Avoiders).  However, the 
category of firms that are not affected by the regulation at all, (Outsiders), far exceeds all 
other categories put together. 
 
Our paper is also a contribution to the “missing middle” literature.  The Factories 
Act is one of the candidate explanations for the lack of medium size enterprises in the 
size distribution of manufacturing firms in India.  Our analysis presents a specific 
estimate of the contribution of the Factories Act to this phenomenon.  Furthermore, it 
distinguishes between and quantifies two aspects of the missing middle—enterprises who 
adjust out of the regulation and enterprises who evade the regulation.  Clearly, the 
analysis needs to be quite different for these two types of the “missing middle.” 
 
The extent of non-compliance raises the question of enforcement.  We have 
shown considerable variation in non-compliance across industries and across states.  The 
impact of enforcement resources on compliance is thus an interesting research question. 
It is also an important question since such widespread non-compliance can undermine 
trust and belief in the legal and regulatory system.  How can one make sense of non-
enforcement of a regulation by a government which has itself passed that regulation?  Of 
course enforcement costs are a possible explanation as are the preferences of the 
government, as suggested by the theory in Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2010).  Responses to 
the Factories Act present an opportunity to test these theories of optimal enforcement, 
and this is an interesting area for further research.  
 
                                                 
12 We have been more successful with this exercise for the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952, because compliance 
and non-compliance can be identified in the same data set. These results are described in Chatterjee and Kanbur (2013). 
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However, if the regulation itself is thought to be inappropriate, then perhaps no 
enforcement is the best answer.  This takes us into the current debates on regulation and 
its impact on informality and productivity.  The policy discourse on regulation has been 
tied up with views on the magnitude and nature of informality, and its consequences for 
growth and efficiency.  Thus, for example, The Economist (September 9, 2010), in a 
survey of Latin America, argues as follows: 
  
 “Thanks largely to baroque regulation, half the labor force toils in the informal 
economy, unable to reap the productivity gains that come from technology and greater scale.” 
 
This statement contains theory (regulation is the cause of informality), an estimate of the 
magnitude (half the labor force).  However, it attributes the whole of informality to 
regulation, whereas the theory of Section 2 says that it is the evaders and the avoiders 
who are responding out of the regulation.  The outsiders were not affected by it in the 
first place.  As Chen and Doane (2008) argue in their review of South Asia: 
 
“….labor market rigidities alone cannot explain the extent of informal 
employment...”. 
 
For India’s Factories Act this paper shows that the outsiders account for 97.3% of 
firms and at least 64.1% of employment.  The evaders and the avoiders between them 
account at most for 1.9% of firms and 11.1% of employment.  The focus on 
(de)regulation as a route to employment and productivity growth therefore has to be 
balanced with a focus on improving the productivity of those enterprises which would not 
be affected greatly, or at all, by the regulation in question. 
 
 Of course the issue of the impact of regulation on productivity of those enterprises 
affected by it is still an important policy question.  Unfortunately, it does not seem to be 
possible using the existing data to credibly quantify this effect for India’s Factories Act. 
The reason is that the data sources for those who register under the Factories Act and 
those who do not are different.  The difference in data sources and protocols gives us 
confidence that we are getting accurate information from those who are not registered—
for example, the issue of illegality is not broached for those who are not in compliance 
with the Factories Act.  But the two data sources do not have a sufficient number of 
common variables to capture exogenous variation in productivity or entrepreneurial 
ability, and the problem of selection into non-compliance or into avoidance cannot be 
addressed credibly. 
 
 The issue of selection could be handled for other regulations and matching data 
sources—Chatterjee and Kanbur (2013) show what can be done for India’s Employees 
Provident Funds Act, 1952.  But such analysis depends on the fortuitous confluence of 
regulation and data sources, and even then may not be fully credible because the data 
itself has been collected under particular administrative protocols.  What this suggests is 
the importance of developing a data set devoted to the task of addressing the impact of 
regulation on firm size and productivity.  Given the significance of the current debates on 
regulation, such investment in information would clearly be worthwhile. 
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Appendix A: On the Electricity Usage Criterion 
 
 The Factories Act requires registration for enterprises with a) 10 or more workers 
with power b) 20 or more workers. So, for establishments with power, the 10 workers or 
more criteria applies, while for establishments without power, 20 or more workers is the 
threshold.  The electricity usage criterion was likely relevant seven decades ago when the 
Act was passed, but what is the situation today? 
 
Let us start by considering the 2010-11 round of NSSO enterprise survey.  After 
excluding firms that report missing employment numbers, we find that there are an 
estimated 3,239 firms that report 0 electricity expenses in the NSSO 2010-11 survey.  
The maximum employment reported by these firms was 4 and the median was 1.  With 
this information, the electricity usage criterion is irrelevant.  The “10 workers or more” 
criterion for identifying compliance is sufficient.  However, electricity usage information 
is missing for about 5.1 million firms. Out of which, nearly 99.4% have employment size 
of less than 10.  The remaining 29,864 firms, account for 11.6% of the firms with 10 or 
more employees in the NSSO.  Of course, if electricity usage was positive for these 
enterprises then there would be no difference when compared to using just the “10 
workers or more” criterion for identifying informality and ignoring electricity usage—we 
would be back to Table 1 of the main text of the paper. 
 
A difference would arise if some of the enterprises in the 10-19 worker range did 
not use electricity.  Table A1 presents the number of firms and workers in categories A, 
B, C and D when missing electricity is set equal to 0.  Let us now compare this with 
Table 1. It is seen that even with the extreme assumption embodied in Table A1, for 
category B the discrepancy in the number of firms is 22,469 and the discrepancy in the 
number of workers is 290,996.  That is, by ignoring electricity usage we may be over 
estimating the number of firms in category B (Evaders) and their total employment by at 
most by 8.7% and 6.4% respectively.  Similarly for category C (Avoiders) we may be 
overestimating the number of firms and total employment by 8.4% and 7.2% 
respectively.  The discrepancies are quite small.  Further, the average characteristics of 
the different categories are not very different from each other.  
 
Although not presented here, the discrepancies for 2005-6 are 12.5% (firms) and 
9.5% (workers), and the average characteristics do not different very much either.  For 
2000-01 there are no missing values but the discrepancies between the two criteria lead to 
a discrepancy in the numbers for category I of 15.5% (firms) and 12.0% (workers). 
 
We would argue, therefore, the electricity use criterion, important though it may 
have been in 1948, is increasingly irrelevant. Ignoring it is unlikely to affect our analysis 
of compliance greatly. 
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A B C D
ASI Firms 
NSSO Firms with 10 or 
more employees using 
power and 20 or more not 
using power
NSSO Firms with 9 
employees using power 
and 19 employees not 
using power NSSO Rest
Number of Firms 143,452                          234,524                                    61,575                                       16,900,000       
Share of Firms 0.8% 1.4% 0.4% 97.5%
Total Employment* 11,500,000                    4,252,672                                561,756                                    30,100,000       
Share of Employment 24.8% 9.2% 1.2% 64.9%
Mean Employment 79.9                                 18.1 9 1.8
Median Employment 21                                     13 9 1
Median Labor Productivtiy (Rupees)** 135,626                          63,915                                      76,400                                       23,400               
*Includes  unpaid family membes/helpers working in the firm
**Labor productivity is total gross value added divided by total employment
Firm Characteristics
Table A1: Compliers, Evaders, Avoiders and Outsiders under the Factories Act, 1948, in 2009‐10, where missing electricity expenditure is 
assumed to be zero.
Firm Categories
 
 
22
Appendix B: Firms in ASI with less than 10 workers 
 
 
  
  
Number of Firms 29,174                                                     
Share in Total ASI  20.3%
Total Employment** 172,858                                                   
Share in total ASI Employment 1.5%
Mean Employment 5.9                                                            
Median Employment 6                                                                
Median Labor Productivtiy (Rupees)**** 88,433                                                     
Median Capital‐Output Ratio*** 0.2                                                            
Median Capital‐Labor Ratio (Rupees)*** 138,457                                                   
Median Wage Rate (Rupees) 42,175                                                     
Median Gross Value Added Share in Total Output 21%
Ownership Type (%)
Sole Propreitory 52%
Partnership  34%
 Limited  Co 13%
Others (Co‐operatives, SHG etc) 1%
Location (%)
Rural 35%
Urban 65%
Maintain Books of Accounts (%) 100%
Median Age (years) 16                                                             
* Usage of power is ignored and only the criteria of 10 or more employees is considered for registration 
 under the Factories Act,1948.  Excludes firms with missng or zero employment.
**Includes unpaid family membes/helpers working in the firm. 
***Capital here is defined as the value (market value for NSSO and book value for ASI) of assets at the end of the year
****Labor productivity is total gross value added divided by total employment
Table B1: Firms with less than 10 employees in the ASI 2009‐10
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